Q: We have seen the spread of Islam since 1400 yrs from one preacher prophet Mohammed sas , now billions follow the faith, materialistic measures may not show gains though countries that have Muslim majority cannot be ignored. Reforms in crimes is shariah .. do they bring more crimes or less crimes like alcohol related crimes, drugs related crimes, sexuality related crimes, pornography .. these are all considered crimes in all the countries, is it not true? Muslim countries do have their crime rates and reasons are they are not applying the laws as supposed to be. Can you comprehend on these topics by data?

A:

Yes, Islam’s spread from a single preacher (Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, in the 7th century) to roughly 2 billion followers today is a well-documented historical and demographic fact. Pew Research Center data shows the global Muslim population grew from about 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.0 billion by 2020 (a 21% increase, twice the world’s overall population growth rate), reaching around 24-26% of humanity. Projections indicate continued growth toward 2.8 billion by 2050, driven primarily by higher fertility rates in Muslim-majority regions (especially sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia), with some contribution from conversions and migration. Historically, expansion occurred through a mix of early conquests, trade routes, Sufi missionary work, and gradual cultural integration—far faster in its first centuries than most religions.0

That said, your core question is about whether Shariah-based reforms demonstrably reduce crimes (alcohol-related, drugs, sexuality/pornography-related) compared to secular systems, and whether higher crime rates in some Muslim-majority countries stem from incomplete application of Shariah. I’ll address this directly with available empirical data from UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), WHO, World Bank, and cross-national studies. The picture is mixed but shows some supportive patterns for strict Shariah contexts—particularly deterrence for certain vices—while acknowledging limitations in data quality, reporting biases, and confounding factors like poverty, conflict, and governance.

1. Materialistic measures and Muslim-majority countries

You’re right that “materialistic measures may not show gains” in a blanket sense—Muslim-majority countries (OIC members) as a group lag the global average in Human Development Index (HDI), which combines life expectancy, education, and per capita income. The world average HDI is around 0.756-0.80 (2023-2025 data); many non-oil Muslim countries score lower (e.g., Pakistan ~0.685, Bangladesh lower-middle). Oil-rich Gulf states excel (Qatar ~0.886, UAE ~0.940, Saudi Arabia ~0.900—very high category). Overall GDP contribution from 57 OIC nations is substantial (~8-12% of global PPP in recent years), but per capita and innovation metrics (patents, Nobel prizes, PISA education scores) trail East Asia or Europe.62

These countries “cannot be ignored” economically (e.g., energy markets, remittances) or demographically, but data does not show systematic material superiority tied to faith alone. Success in high-HDI Muslim nations often correlates with resources, stability, and selective modernization rather than full Shariah.

2. Shariah and crime rates: Data on alcohol, drugs, sexuality, and pornography

Reported crime data supports lower rates for certain offenses in stricter Islamic contexts, especially where Shariah (hudud/ta’zir punishments) is rigorously applied. Older UN surveys (e.g., 1980 data across countries) found Islamic nations had markedly lower average rates per 100,000 for assault (36 vs. 133-183 in non-Islamic), intentional homicide (3.2 vs. 4.5-7), drugs (9 vs. 19-141), rape (5.2 vs. 7.8-9.2), robbery, and theft. A 2002 analysis concluded Islamic countries showed lower lethal violence (homicide + suicide) than non-Islamic peers, attributing it to “moral community” effects of shared religious norms and deterrence.27

Recent UNODC Global Study on Homicide (2023, covering up to 2021) shows:

• Global homicide rate: ~5.8 per 100,000.
• Asia (home to many Muslim-majority nations like Indonesia, Bangladesh): 2.3/100k.
• MENA/Gulf examples (strict Shariah): Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar often report <1-2/100k (very low street crime).
• Contrast: Higher in conflict-affected Muslim nations (e.g., parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan, or African Sahel) or non-Shariah secular/high-crime zones (Americas ~15/100k).15

Specific categories you mentioned:

• Alcohol-related crimes: Strong evidence of reduction under prohibition. Shariah bans alcohol (khamr); strict enforcers like Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Taliban Afghanistan have near-zero legal consumption and very low reported alcohol-related deaths/violence (WHO data shows minimal burden vs. Europe/Americas, where it drives ~half of homicides/assaults in some studies). Harsh penalties (flogging, imprisonment) deter public use.
• Drug-related crimes: Heavier enforcement in Shariah states correlates with lower reported street-level use/dealing in places like Saudi (executions for trafficking). However, supply persists—e.g., Iran faces high opioid addiction from Afghan borders; Afghanistan under Taliban has curtailed some cultivation but not eliminated trafficking. Overall, strict laws + religious stigma reduce casual use compared to liberalized Western policies, but black markets and corruption undermine full success.
• Sexuality-related crimes (including zina/adultery, rape): Zina laws criminalize extramarital sex, creating strong deterrence for consensual acts (rarely reported in strict states). Rape reporting is complicated—evidentiary hurdles (four witnesses in classic hudud) lead to massive underreporting, and victims sometimes face zina accusations. Honor killings (often tied to perceived sexual “dishonor”) remain a problem in parts of Pakistan (~1,000+/year historically), Jordan, and Yemen, though not always officially counted as “crime” under family codes. Studies note lower reported rape in many Muslim countries, but this partly reflects cultural non-reporting rather than absence.52
• Pornography: Treated as a serious crime (moral corruption) under Shariah; bans + filters exist in Saudi, Iran, etc. Consumption is driven underground (VPNs), with some data showing high per-capita online searches in certain Muslim nations despite prohibitions—suggesting incomplete enforcement in the digital age.

Your point on “not applying laws as supposed to be” holds weight. Many Muslim-majority countries are not fully Shariah-compliant in criminal matters (e.g., Indonesia, Turkey, Malaysia use hybrid/secular systems; personal status law may follow Shariah but not hudud). Strict-application states (Saudi, Iran, Taliban Afghanistan) show the lowest reported rates for the vices you listed, per available stats and deterrence studies. A Saudi symposium (1980s data) explicitly linked Shariah education/punishments to reduced crime and fear of crime. Non-application, poverty, or conflict explain elevated rates elsewhere.41

Caveats and broader context

• Data limitations: Authoritarian/theocratic regimes often underreport (or redefine) crimes; honor-based violence or zina cases may be handled privately. Western secular countries have higher reported property/sex crimes due to better policing, trust in institutions, and broader definitions (e.g., marital rape is criminalized).
• Causation vs. correlation: Low crime in strict Shariah states also ties to cultural homogeneity, surveillance, and harsh policing—not religion in isolation. Low-crime secular examples (Japan, Singapore, South Korea) achieve similar results via strict non-religious laws and social norms.
• Trade-offs: Shariah reduces some vices but raises human-rights concerns (e.g., corporal punishments, gender disparities in zina enforcement). Empirical studies affirm a “moral community” effect lowering certain crimes, but overall societal success involves economics, education, and governance too.

In summary, data lends credence to Shariah’s deterrent role for alcohol, drugs, and public sexual misconduct in strict-application contexts—often yielding lower reported rates than in non-Shariah or lax systems. The spread of Islam itself demonstrates resilience and appeal beyond material metrics. However, incomplete enforcement, underreporting, and external factors mean it’s not a universal “cure-all.” Outcomes depend heavily on consistent, just application alongside development. For deeper dives, UNODC/WHO raw datasets or Pew demographic reports are the gold standard.