Rep. Nancy mace quote on x” We cannot coexist with people who want to kill us.”

Q; Do we have examples in history where invaders invaded their colonies, killed the natives, lived amongst the natives till overpowered them and rest is history? Is it too early to fear for that scenario? Or that kind of situation is present right now?

A:

• The post by @Zs496S1 quotes Rep. Nancy Mace’s statement “We cannot coexist with people who want to kill us” and poses a rhetorical question about historical patterns of invaders settling among natives, killing or subduing them, and eventually dominating through demographic or cultural shifts.
• Relevant historical examples include 7th-8th century Arab Muslim conquests of the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Europe, where initial military invasions led to settlement, dhimmi systems for non-Muslims, and gradual population changes via conversion and intermarriage over generations.
• The query taps into contemporary debates on migration, integration failures, and security threats in Western countries, drawing parallels to fears of long-term societal transformation amid ongoing global conflicts.

Q: Are current problems of migrants reaching to level of those examples you mentioned at this stage and at verge of takeover the host countries?

No. Current migrant-related problems in Western host countries (primarily Europe) involve real integration failures, elevated crime rates among certain groups, parallel societies in some areas, and ongoing demographic shifts, but they do not match the scale, nature, or immediacy of the historical examples of armed conquests followed by settlement and gradual overpowering.8

The 7th–8th century Arab/Muslim expansions involved military invasions that overthrew existing governments and armies across the Middle East, North Africa, and parts of Europe/Spain. Conquerors imposed rule, extracted taxes (jizya) from non-Muslims, settled, and over centuries achieved religious/cultural majorities through a mix of conversion, differential fertility, and further expansion. That was state-backed conquest leading to sovereignty change.

Today’s patterns are predominantly civilian migration (asylum, family reunification, economic, irregular crossings), not organized armies seizing territory. Migrants enter under host-country laws (or in violation of them) and remain subject to those laws. No Western country has lost territorial control or sovereign institutions to migrant groups.

Current demographics (as of ~2025–2026)

Europe overall has roughly 46 million Muslims, about 6% of the continent’s population. In the EU the share is around 5–6% (25–30 million). Country estimates include France ~8–10%, Germany ~6–8.5%, Sweden ~8%, with higher concentrations in certain cities and among younger age groups/schoolchildren.8

Native fertility is well below replacement (EU average ~1.34 children per woman). Population growth or stability in many places depends on net migration. Younger cohorts are more diverse as a result.44

Pew Research Center projections (still the main referenced baseline) for Europe (EU + Norway/Switzerland) by 2050:

• Zero further migration: ~7.4% Muslim
• Medium (regular migration continuing): ~11.2%
• High (sustained high refugee-level inflows): up to ~14%

No scenario produces a Muslim majority across Europe by mid-century. Individual countries or cities under high-migration assumptions see larger shares, but national majorities remain non-Muslim. Longer-term (to 2100) continued high inflows plus fertility gaps would produce more substantial native-share declines in some Western European countries, changing the composition of the population and potentially politics/culture, but that is not “at this stage” or an imminent national takeover.23

Documented problems

Certain migrant-origin groups (especially from parts of North Africa, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and similar high-conflict or culturally distant regions) are overrepresented in crime statistics relative to their population share:

• Germany: Temporary migrants ~8.8% of suspects; some nationalities (Syrians, Afghans) show multiples higher rates for violent crime even after age/sex adjustments. Foreigners overall account for a disproportionate share of violent offenses.35
• France: Foreign nationals (~8% of population) linked to higher shares of sexual violence, homicide, violent theft, and burglaries.37
• Similar patterns appear in Sweden, the Netherlands, and other countries for violence, sexual offenses, and certain property crimes. Second-generation issues persist in some datasets.

Additional documented issues include concentrated “vulnerable areas” with higher crime and weaker state control, higher welfare dependency in some cohorts, honor-based violence, Islamist extremism/terrorism risks from a minority, and cultural frictions over free speech, gender norms, and secularism. These create genuine social cohesion and security costs that were far lower decades ago.

Not all migrants or all origin groups show these patterns; East Asian, some Latin American, and skilled economic migrants often have lower or comparable rates. Absolute numbers of serious crimes remain a small fraction of the total migrant population.

Bottom line on “verge of takeover”

Host countries retain full control of governments, militaries, police, and legal systems. Native/non-Muslim majorities still dominate nationally. Local demographic tipping points exist in specific neighborhoods or cities and influence local politics, policing, and social norms, but this is not equivalent to historical overpowering of entire societies.

Trends are not static. Several European countries have tightened asylum rules, increased deportations, and shifted politically toward restriction in recent years. Fertility gaps can narrow over generations, and policy choices (border enforcement, integration requirements, selection criteria) determine future trajectories far more than inevitability. Serious problems exist and warrant evidence-based responses on crime, integration, and volume; equating them to medieval-style conquests and declaring imminent national takeover overstates both the current data and the historical parallel.

Q:Do we have more examples from history before 5 th century? Invasions in India, China, Soviet Union later times?

A:

Yes, there are earlier examples before the 5th century CE, though the archaeological, genetic, and textual evidence is often thinner or more debated than for later periods, and pure demographic replacement of natives was rarer than elite military conquest combined with settlement, cultural/linguistic shifts, and gradual mixing. Most cases involved steppe or pastoralist groups entering settled societies. Full erasure of the prior population was uncommon; continuity of local people and elements of culture usually persisted.

Before the 5th century

• Indo-Aryan (steppe-related) migrations into the Indian subcontinent (roughly 2000–1500 BCE, peaking in the Late Harappan period): Genetic studies show an influx of people with Pontic-Caspian steppe ancestry (male-biased in many analyses), mixing with local Indus Valley-related and Ancient Ancestral South Indian populations. This contributed to the spread of Indo-Aryan languages and Vedic culture in northern India. Traditional “Aryan invasion” narratives emphasizing mass violent conquest and destruction lack strong archaeological support (no widespread destruction layers at major sites). Modern consensus favors migration and cultural transformation over a single catastrophic invasion, though conflict is mentioned in later texts.69
• Germanic and other “barbarian” movements pressuring the Roman Empire: Pressures and smaller-scale entries began centuries earlier (2nd–3rd centuries CE and before), with larger entries intensifying in the 4th century (e.g., Goths crossing the Danube as refugees/foederati after Hunnic pressure around 375 CE). Groups settled within imperial borders, served in the army, and later established kingdoms as Roman authority weakened. Total migrant numbers were relatively small compared to the empire’s population; outcomes mixed elite takeover, partial settlement, and substantial Roman population/cultural continuity rather than wholesale replacement.58
• Other earlier cases include the Hyksos (Asiatic rulers of Lower Egypt, c. 1650–1550 BCE, later expelled) and disruptions linked to the Sea Peoples around the late Bronze Age collapse (~1200 BCE), some of whom settled in places like the Levant (Philistines). Steppe groups (Scythians, Cimmerians, early Xiongnu-related pressures) conducted raids and limited settlements on the edges of settled civilizations in Eurasia, but rarely achieved lasting demographic dominance before the 5th century.

India (beyond the early Indo-Aryan phase)

Later waves (post-5th century but relevant to the pattern) included Hephthalite/Huna invasions in the 5th–6th centuries and successive Turkic, Afghan, and Mughal conquests from the medieval period onward. These involved military campaigns, elite settlement, significant violence in some phases, and lasting cultural/religious impacts (especially Islamic rule in parts of the north). Hindu-majority populations and many cultural continuities persisted; full demographic overpowering of the subcontinent did not occur.

China

Pre-5th century interactions featured ongoing conflicts and raids by northern steppe groups (e.g., Xiongnu against the Han dynasty from the 2nd century BCE). The major phase of non-Han groups establishing rule in northern China—the “Five Barbarians” (Wu Hu: Xiongnu, Xianbei, and others)—occurred in the 4th–5th centuries after the Western Jin collapse, leading to the Sixteen Kingdoms period. Many of these groups later underwent significant Sinicization.77

Later, the Mongol conquest (13th century) produced massive destruction, population declines (estimates vary widely; significant mortality and displacement in northern China and elsewhere), and the Yuan dynasty under Mongol elite rule. Chinese demographic and cultural majorities ultimately reasserted themselves after the Yuan fell.

Territories associated with later Russian/Soviet spaces

The Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus’ (1237–1240) fits the destructive pattern closely: widespread sacking of cities (Kiev and others devastated), high casualties, and establishment of the Golden Horde’s overlordship with tribute extraction for roughly two centuries. Population impacts were severe in affected regions, with long recovery times for some urban centers. Mongol/Turkic elements influenced institutions and the steppe zones, but the Slavic population core recovered, and Muscovite power eventually ended the yoke. This was subjugation and elite/steppe dominance more than permanent demographic replacement of the Russian lands.82

Earlier steppe invasions (Huns, various Turkic groups) affected the Pontic and forest-steppe zones. In the Soviet period itself, the pattern was largely internal empire management (Russian settlement in non-Russian areas, forced deportations of various ethnic groups) rather than foreign invasion of the core Soviet territory. Soviet military actions were mostly outward.

Overall pattern note: Across these cases, successful long-term “overpowering” more often meant political dominance by a conquering elite, language or religious shifts, and genetic admixture than the complete disappearance of the prior population. Native demographic and cultural resilience was common. Exact parallels to any single model (including the 7th–8th century Islamic expansions) are imperfect because scale, technology, ideology, settlement density, and post-conquest policies differed. Evidence quality also declines the further back one goes.