As compiled by grok

The term “jihad” (often spelled “jehad” in some transliterations) is an Arabic word that fundamentally means “striving,” “struggling,” or “exerting effort” in the path of God, encompassing a broad range of actions aimed at aligning personal and societal life with Islamic principles. 22 In Islamic theology, it is not inherently tied to violence but includes spiritual, moral, intellectual, and physical dimensions. Traditional classifications divide it into the “greater jihad” (al-jihad al-akbar), which refers to the internal struggle against one’s own sinful impulses, ego, and base desires—this is often considered the most important form by many scholars, including Sufi traditions and figures like Ibn Taymiyyah, who emphasized self-purification as a prerequisite for any external action. 22 The “lesser jihad” (al-jihad al-asghar) involves external efforts, which can be non-violent (e.g., through speech, writing, or good deeds to promote justice and combat wrongdoing) or violent (armed struggle under specific conditions). 22 This distinction draws from a hadith (Prophetic tradition) where Muhammad reportedly described returning from battle as the “lesser” jihad compared to the ongoing inner fight against passions, though some conservative scholars question its authenticity due to a weak chain of transmission. 22

Offensive vs. Defensive Uses

Jihad in the context of armed struggle (jihad bis-saif, or “jihad of the sword”) has historically been categorized into defensive and offensive forms, with strict rules derived from the Quran, hadith, and classical jurisprudence (fiqh) to limit harm, prohibit aggression, and protect non-combatants like women, children, the elderly, clergy, and civilians. 10 21 These rules include no mutilation, unnecessary destruction, or targeting of places of worship, and emphasize proportionality and the preference for peace when possible (e.g., Quran 8:61 mandates accepting peace offers). 21 22

• Defensive Jihad: This is the most widely accepted and obligatory form, triggered by direct aggression, invasion, or persecution (fitna) against Muslims, their religion, land, or community. 10 It is seen as a duty (fard kifaya, collective obligation) to repel attackers, but it ends once the threat is neutralized. 10 Quranic support includes verses like 2:190 (“Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress limits”) and 22:39–40, which permit fighting in self-defense against oppression. 21 Historical examples include early Muslim defenses in Medina against Meccan tribes, anti-colonial resistances (e.g., Emir Abdelkader in Algeria against French occupation in the 19th century), and the Afghan Mujahideen’s fight against Soviet invasion in the 1980s, which was framed as defensive but later influenced global jihadist ideologies. 21 22 In Shia Islam, defensive jihad is always permissible, but it does not require the leadership of the Imam (who is in occultation). 22 Mainstream scholars, including those from al-Azhar University, condemn any transgression, such as harming innocents, as un-Islamic. 11 21
• Offensive Jihad: This is more contested and historically linked to expanding Islamic influence or removing barriers to the faith’s propagation, but without forcing conversions (Quran 2:256: “There is no compulsion in religion”). 10 22 It aims to defend the oppressed, promote justice, and ensure freedom for da’wah (invitation to Islam), often justified by verses like 2:193 (“Fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression”) and 4:75 (fighting for the weak and ill-treated). 10 Classical jurists (e.g., from the Hanafi school) debated whether unbelief alone justifies war—many said no, restricting it to active hostility. 22 In early Islamic conquests (7th–8th centuries), it facilitated expansion from Arabia to vast territories, motivated by religious, economic, and political factors, but with protections for non-Muslims (e.g., paying jizya tax for exemption from military service). 22 Shia tradition limits offensive jihad to the Mahdi’s return, while Sunni modernists like Muhammad Abduh emphasized it as outdated or purely defensive in today’s world. 22 Contemporary scholarly bodies, like the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, adapt it to modern tools like international treaties and media for non-violent propagation, rather than military action. 10

Some fundamentalist thinkers, like Sayyid Qutb and Ibn Taymiyyah, have revived offensive interpretations to justify struggles against perceived “un-Islamic” regimes or Western influences, viewing it as a permanent obligation for Islamic revival. 20 21 22 However, this is a minority view, and classical doctrine divided the world into realms of peace (dar al-Islam) and war (dar al-harb), allowing truces but not permanent peace without expansion—though pacifist schools limited all jihad to defense. 22

Current Uses: Rhetorical vs. Real Terms

In modern contexts, “jihad” is invoked across a spectrum, from metaphorical and non-violent to literal and violent, reflecting diverse interpretations among Muslims (who number over 1.8 billion worldwide). 12 15 Gallup surveys show many Muslims define it as a personal duty to God, hard work, or promoting peace, rather than warfare. 22 It cannot be used for purely political motives, forced conversion, or against governments ensuring religious freedom, per some interpretations. 12

• Rhetorical or Non-Violent Uses: Often symbolic or motivational, referring to efforts in education (jihad al-tarbiyyah), missionary work (jihad al-da’wah), economic development, intellectual discourse, or social reform. 22 For example, Tunisia’s Habib Bourguiba called nation-building a “jihad,” and groups like the Ahmadiyya community emphasize it as inner moral struggle without violence. 15 22 In media and activism, it’s used rhetorically to rally against injustice, as in anti-colonial movements or modern protests (e.g., Palestinian groups like Hamas and PIJ frame resistance to occupation as “jihad and resistance,” blending ideology with calls for unity). 17 Online “virtual jihad” channels dissent through non-violent expression like poetry, apps, or social media, allowing people to vent frustrations without physical action, as seen in al-Qaeda’s magazines like Inspire that mix rhetoric with recruitment appeals. 16 18 Shia contexts extend it to cultural remembrance, like Ashura processions opposing tyranny. 22 This form is mainstream and aligns with the “jihad of the tongue/pen” for persuasion and truth-speaking. 19
• Real or Violent Uses: In actual terms, it manifests as armed conflict, predominantly defensive in mainstream views but offensive or indiscriminate among extremists. 21 Real-world examples include Houthi rebels in Yemen invoking jihad against Saudi-led coalitions (defensive framing), or Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad using it for rocket attacks and operations against Israel, often justified as resistance to occupation but criticized for targeting civilians. 17 21 Extremist groups like al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram employ it for global terrorism, suicide bombings, and conquests (e.g., 9/11 attacks, ISIS’s 2014–2017 caliphate in Iraq/Syria), drawing on reinterpretations by figures like Osama bin Laden and Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir to justify beheadings, torture, and civilian deaths—acts condemned as “unholy” deviations by scholars like Shaykh al-Tantawi. 11 15 21 These represent a minority, Salafi-jihadist strain amplified by visibility, but they distort classical limits by ignoring proportionality and non-combatant protections. 20 Women’s roles in such groups (e.g., ISIS) have evolved rhetorically toward combat under “defensive jihad” pretexts, though often limited in practice. 13

Overall, while extremists have co-opted “jihad” for violence, the majority of Muslims and scholars view it as a positive, multifaceted striving, with violent forms restricted to defense and condemned when abusive. 12 21 Interpretations vary by sect, culture, and politics, but peace is the Quranic norm. 11

REAL VS RHETORICAL FEARS?

The fear surrounding jihad—often misconstrued in popular discourse as synonymous with violent extremism or terrorism—contains elements of both legitimate concern and fear-mongering, depending on the context, actors involved, and how the term is framed. Similarly, pro-jihadist groups (referring here to militant jihadist organizations like ISIS, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates, which interpret jihad as armed struggle against perceived enemies) possess asymmetric strengths that can challenge powerful nations, but these are far from overwhelming or existential threats to superpowers. Their capabilities often exploit vulnerabilities rather than match conventional military might, and the “irrational fears” expressed by some nations may stem from amplified narratives rather than purely objective risk assessments. I’ll break this down step by step, drawing on global terrorism trends, historical patterns, and analyses of asymmetric warfare.

Is the Fear of Jihad Real or Fear-Mongering?

Fear of jihad is not entirely unfounded, as jihadist ideologies have fueled real-world violence and instability, but it is frequently exaggerated or weaponized for political, social, or media purposes, leading to Islamophobia and stigmatization of broader Muslim communities.

• Real Aspects of the Fear: Jihadist organizations continue to pose tangible threats through terrorism, particularly in conflict zones and via transnational attacks. For instance, Salafi-jihadist groups (a subset of militant jihadists) accounted for over 55% of global terrorist attacks in recent years, with Africa (especially the Sahel region) as the most active theater. 27 The Global Terrorism Index 2025 reports that the number of countries experiencing terrorist attacks rose from 58 in 2023 to 66 in 2024, with deteriorations in 45 countries—the highest since 2018—and the four deadliest organizations (all jihadist-linked) substantially increasing their impact. 22 High-profile incidents, such as ISIS-inspired attacks in the U.S. (e.g., New Orleans in January 2025) and surges in Syria (nearly 700 attacks in 2024, up from about 233 in 2023), demonstrate ongoing resilience and global reach. 24 In sub-Saharan Africa, failed states provide sanctuaries for al-Qaeda and ISIS affiliates, leading to thousands of deaths annually (e.g., Burkina Faso saw 1,135 terrorism deaths in 2022, rising amid jihadist activity). 25 These threats extend to powerful nations through lone-actor terrorism, foreign fighters returning from conflict zones, and disruptions in regions like the Middle East and South Asia, where groups like ISIS-Khorasan (ISK) have expanded operations beyond Afghanistan, targeting entities like China via attacks on Belt and Road projects. 21 24 U.S. intelligence assessments highlight that 19 of the top 21 terrorist groups operate in the Middle East and Central Asia, underscoring a persistent danger to stability. 26
• Fear-Mongering Elements: Much of the fear is amplified by misconceptions, selective framing, and political exploitation, often conflating the broader Islamic concept of jihad (meaning “striving” or “struggle,” which can be non-violent, like personal moral improvement) with extremism. 15 In Western and non-Muslim-majority contexts, terms like “jihad” evoke Islamophobia, as seen in derogatory labels during crises (e.g., “Corona-jihad” amid COVID-19 stigma against Muslims). 18 In India, phrases like “vote jihad” or “land jihad” are used pejoratively to describe Muslim civic participation or economic activities, framing them as threats in family chats and media for electoral gain. 17 Scholarly analyses point to biases where jihad is portrayed as inherently violent, ignoring its non-militant interpretations, which fuels unjustified fear and discrimination. 12 13 Political fundraising in the U.S. has leveraged anti-Muslim sentiment as a “big bucks jihad” tool, exploiting cultural fears for donations. 19 Even in security contexts, 63% of Western jihadist attackers pledge allegiance to groups like ISIS, but this is often sensationalized without noting that most Muslims reject such violence. 14

In essence, while jihadist terrorism is a genuine security issue (with 7,000–9,000 annual attacks globally), 27 the fear is often irrational when generalized to all Muslims or inflated for agendas like justifying military interventions or domestic policies. Trends show terrorism deaths fluctuating (e.g., down in some regions like Myanmar but up in Africa), but not escalating to levels that threaten the existence of powerful nations. 22 25

Strength of Pro-Jihadist Groups vs. Powerful Nations

Pro-jihadist entities (e.g., ISIS affiliates, al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah) lack the conventional strength to directly overpower superpowers like the U.S., China, or Russia, but they excel in asymmetric warfare, where disparities in resources lead to prolonged, costly conflicts that erode the stronger side’s will, economy, and public support. This asymmetry makes fears seem “irrational” in terms of existential risk but rational in terms of persistent disruption.

• Jihadist Strengths in Asymmetry: These groups operate as non-state actors with ideological appeal, low operational costs, and tactics like guerrilla warfare, terrorism, cyberattacks, and propaganda to exploit vulnerabilities. 30 31 For example, ISIS has evolved post-caliphate (diminished from 42,000 fighters at its 2014 peak to scattered affiliates), focusing on decentralized attacks and inspiring lone wolves, as seen in its 2024–2025 activities in Syria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and beyond. 7 24 Al-Qaeda prioritizes global jihad through elite vanguards and alliances, while ISIS emphasizes territorial grabs and media recruitment. 4 In the Sahel, jihadists thrive in ungoverned spaces, converging with criminal networks for funding and recruitment. 3 21 Historical successes, like the Soviet-Afghan War (where mujahideen outlasted a superpower) or U.S. struggles in Vietnam and Afghanistan, show how insurgents use hit-and-run tactics, IEDs, and local support to turn military superiority into a liability. 31 37 Modern tech (e.g., drones, social media) amplifies this, akin to startups disrupting giants. 33 Groups like HTS in Syria or the Taliban in Afghanistan have even achieved governance, inspiring others. 21 27
• Limitations and Superpower Advantages: Jihadists rarely “win” outright; their longevity comes from survival, not conquest. 5 Superpowers dominate in conventional metrics—e.g., the U.S. has led coalitions like the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, repatriating fighters and refining strategies against evolving threats. 28 Territorial losses (ISIS’s caliphate collapsed by 2019) and counterterrorism efforts (e.g., drone strikes, intelligence sharing) limit their scale. 0 6 Internal weaknesses, like ideological infighting (jihadists attacking fellow jihadists), further erode strength. 8 Powerful nations express fears due to asymmetric costs: e.g., 9/11 reshaped U.S. policy despite minimal jihadist resources, leading to trillions in wars. 34 However, these fears can seem irrational when overblown, as jihadists pose no peer-level military threat and global terrorism deaths (while tragic) are dwarfed by other risks like conventional wars or crime.

Overall, the fear of jihad reflects a mix of valid security concerns and manipulative narratives, while pro-jihadist strength lies in endurance and disruption, not parity. Powerful nations mitigate this through adaptation—focusing on intelligence, alliances, and addressing root causes like governance failures—rather than succumbing to exaggerated panic.