In Islamic theology, the question of whether God (Allah) creates good and evil is tied to concepts like divine predestination (qadar), human free will, the nature of morality, and interpretations of Quranic verses such as Surah Al-Falaq (113:2), which refers to seeking refuge “from the evil of that which He created,” and Surah Al-Qamar (54:49), stating “Indeed, We have created all things with predestination.” A hadith from the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) also affirms belief in destiny, “its good and its evil.” However, interpretations vary across theological schools, with debates centering on whether evil is absolute or relative, intrinsic or defined by divine command, and the role of reason versus revelation. Below, I outline key views from major schools and scholars, drawing from orthodox Sunni perspectives (Ash’ari and Maturidi) as well as the rationalist Mu’tazila.

Mu’tazila School

The Mu’tazila, a rationalist school prominent in the 8th-10th centuries CE, emphasized human reason (‘aql) and divine justice. They argued that good and evil are intrinsic qualities inherent in actions, discernible by intellect independent of revelation. God does not create moral evil; instead, humans generate it through their free will, as God only commands what is inherently good and prohibits what is inherently evil. This preserves God’s justice—He cannot be the author of evil without contradicting His benevolence. For instance:

• Actions like lying or injustice are evil by their rational nature, not merely because God prohibits them.
• God is bound to act in accordance with reason and the “best” (al-aslah), meaning He creates only good and permits evil only through human agency.
  Scholars like Abu al-Hudhayl al-Allaf (d. 841 CE) and al-Qadi Abd al-Jabbar (d. 1025 CE) defended this, asserting that revelation confirms rational morals but does not define them. 12 13 4 This view was influential among early Abbasid thinkers but later critiqued as anthropomorphizing God by limiting His will.

Ash’ari School

The Ash’ari school, founded by Abu al-Hasan al-Ash’ari (d. 936 CE) and dominant in Sunni orthodoxy, holds that God creates all actions, including good and evil, as everything originates from His will and power. Moral values are not intrinsic but determined solely by divine command via revelation— what God commands is good, and what He forbids is evil. Reason cannot independently judge morality, as it lacks full knowledge of divine wisdom. Humans “acquire” (kasb) actions created by God, maintaining accountability without true independent creation.

• Evil is not absolute but relative or partial, permitted for wise purposes like testing faith or enabling free will.
• Key argument: Justice is whatever God does, not a rational standard binding Him.
  Scholars like al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE) and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1209 CE) elaborated this, with al-Razi viewing good and evil as culturally perceived pleasure and pain. Al-Ash’ari himself shifted from Mu’tazila views to emphasize God’s absolute sovereignty, rejecting rational constraints on divinity. 13 12 2 10 This position affirms that God creates evil in the sense of permitting it within creation, but it serves greater goods.

Maturidi School

The Maturidi school, founded by Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 944 CE) and prevalent among Hanafi Sunnis, takes a middle path between Mu’tazila rationalism and Ash’ari occasionalism. Like Ash’aris, they affirm God creates all actions (good and evil), but reason can partially discern moral values independently, as God instills this knowledge in the human intellect (fitra). However, revelation remains the ultimate authority for most rulings, and morality derives from God’s wisdom.

• Humans have real choice, but actions are ultimately God’s creation.
• Good and evil can be known rationally in broad terms (e.g., faith in God is inherently good), but specific Shari’a commands require revelation.
  Al-Maturidi argued that intellect perceives some morals via divine inspiration, differing from Ash’aris by granting reason a confirmatory role while aligning with them on divine creation of all things. Later scholars like al-Nasafi (d. 1142 CE) supported this in exegeses of Quranic verses like Surah Ash-Shams (91:8), interpreting it as God teaching the soul to distinguish good from evil through innate reason. 12 5 1

Other Scholarly Views

• Ibn Sina (Avicenna, d. 1037 CE): Influenced by philosophy, he saw evil as privation or inadequacy (naqs), not a created entity—necessary for the hierarchy of existence (e.g., fire’s potential to burn is part of its good nature). 10
• Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE): A Hanbali scholar often aligned with orthodoxy, he stated God does not create “pure evil,” only relative evil with wise purposes (e.g., suffering tests believers). “In everything that God creates is a wise purpose by virtue of which it is good.” 10
• Shi’a Perspectives: Similar to Mu’tazila and Maturidi, many Imami Shi’a emphasize rational discernment of good and evil, with God creating all but humans responsible for moral choices to uphold divine justice. 1

In summary, from mainstream Sunni (Ash’ari/Maturidi) views, yes, God creates good and evil as part of His all-encompassing creation, but evil is relative and serves divine wisdom. Mu’tazila dissent by denying God’s direct creation of moral evil. These debates highlight Islam’s balance between divine sovereignty and human responsibility, with no single “true” view but rather scholarly ijtihad (effort) based on Quran and Sunnah.

WHAT OTHER FAITHS TELL US ON THIS TOPIC

Christianity

Christian theology grapples with the problem of evil (theodicy), questioning how an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God could allow or create evil. Most scholars deny that God directly creates moral evil, viewing it instead as a consequence of free will or a privation (absence) of good. For instance:

• St. Augustine of Hippo (d. 430 CE) argued that evil is not a substance created by God but a corruption or lack of goodness in His perfect creation, stemming from the misuse of free will by angels and humans (e.g., the Fall in Genesis). God created beings capable of evil to allow for greater goods like love and redemption. 4 7 45
• Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274 CE) echoed this, stating in his Summa Theologica that evil has no positive existence; God creates all things good, but evil arises secondarily from defects in created beings. 3 4
• Some interpretations of Isaiah 45:7 (“I form light and create darkness, I make well-being and create calamity”) suggest God permits or creates natural evils (calamities) for divine purposes, but not moral evil, which originates from Satan or human sin. 1 5 Modern thinkers like C.S. Lewis describe evil as a “bent” in creation, not directly authored by God, emphasizing that suffering can lead to spiritual growth. 0 8

Judaism

Jewish thought affirms God’s creation of everything, including the potential for evil, but emphasizes human responsibility and divine justice. Evil is often seen as necessary for free will and moral growth, not as an independent force.

• The Hebrew Bible (e.g., Isaiah 45:7) states God creates both good and evil (or “peace and calamity”), interpreted by scholars as God authoring the conditions for moral choice. 10 12
• In Rabbinic tradition, the “evil inclination” (yetzer ha-ra) is created by God as a drive for survival and ambition, which can lead to sin if unchecked, balanced by the “good inclination” (yetzer ha-tov). 17 18 Maimonides (d. 1204 CE) viewed evil as privation or a result of matter’s imperfection, not directly from God, preserving His goodness. 11 19
• Kabbalistic scholars like Isaac Luria (d. 1572 CE) described evil as arising from the “shattering” (shevirah) of divine vessels during creation, allowing for tikkun (repair) through human actions. 16 17 Contemporary thinkers like Rabbi Harold Kushner argue God is not omnipotent over evil, prioritizing compassion over power. 11

Hinduism

Hinduism does not posit a single creator God strictly separating good and evil; instead, they are interconnected aspects of the cosmic order (dharma and adharma), maintained through cycles of creation. Evil is often relative, arising from illusion (maya) or karma.

• In Vedantic philosophy, Brahman (ultimate reality) transcends good and evil; creation includes both as necessary for balance and evolution. 20 25 Adi Shankara (d. 820 CE) taught that evil is illusory, a product of ignorance (avidya), not created by a personal God. 25 28
• In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna (an avatar of Vishnu) explains that good and evil stem from the three gunas (qualities: sattva/goodness, rajas/passion, tamas/ignorance), inherent in creation for the soul’s journey toward liberation (moksha). 22 23 Evil gods like demons (asuras) are created by deities but represent necessary opposition. 20
• Shaivite scholars like Abhinavagupta (d. 1015 CE) viewed evil as part of Shiva’s divine play (lila), where good and evil are unified in non-dual reality. 25 Modern interpreters note Hinduism avoids the “problem of evil” by not requiring God to be solely good. 27 28

Buddhism

Buddhism lacks a creator God, so good and evil are not “created” by a deity but arise from interdependent causes like ignorance, desire, and karma. The focus is on overcoming suffering (dukkha) rather than its divine origin.

• The Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama, c. 5th century BCE) taught in the Four Noble Truths that evil (unwholesome actions) stems from the three poisons (greed, hatred, delusion), not from a god’s creation. 38 39

Q:In continuation of the above topic.. GOD created cow which gives milk and also created poisonous snakes.. are these not same GODs creations and what logic explains them from different faiths?

Islamic perspectives:

In Islamic theology, all animals—whether beneficial like cows or potentially harmful like poisonous snakes—are indeed creations of Allah, as stated in the Quran: “And there is no creature on earth but that upon Allah is its provision” (Surah Hud 11:6). Cows and similar livestock are highlighted as signs of divine mercy and provision; for instance, Surah An-Nahl (16:5-8) describes cattle as created for human benefit, providing milk, meat, warmth from hides, and transportation, emphasizing gratitude to Allah. 10 Poisonous snakes, while capable of harm, are also part of this creation, serving purposes rooted in divine wisdom (hikmah), even if not fully comprehensible to humans.

Scholars explain this through several logics:

• Tests of Faith and Human Weakness: Harmful creatures like snakes demonstrate human vulnerability and test patience and reliance on Allah. A small insect or snake can cause suffering, reminding believers of Allah’s ultimate control and encouraging submission. This aligns with the broader theodicy where apparent evils foster spiritual growth and distinguish the faithful. 10 7
• Ecological Balance and Self-Defense: What harms humans may benefit the animal itself (e.g., venom for hunting or protection) or the ecosystem. Snakes control pests like rodents, maintaining natural order. Many “harmful” animals become food for beneficial ones, illustrating interconnected cycles in creation. 10 2
• Medical and Practical Benefits: Poisons from snakes yield antidotes and drugs; for example, snake venom is used in modern medicine for treatments like blood pressure medications or painkillers, turning potential harm into healing. 10 8 2
• Manifestation of Divine Wisdom and Blessings: Opposites in creation (beneficial vs. harmful) highlight Allah’s favors; without knowing harm, one cannot fully appreciate good. Scholars like Sheikh Muhammad Salih Al-Munajjid affirm that Allah creates nothing in vain, and even harmful elements serve greater goods, such as humiliating tyrants (e.g., via insects) or rewarding those who endure or confront them bravely. 10

Islamic rulings permit killing harmful animals if they pose a threat, as per hadith narrated by Aisha (ra): The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) identified five “mischief-doers” that may be killed even in the sacred state of ihram, including poisonous snakes, scorpions, crows, kites, and rabid dogs (Sahih Bukhari and Muslim). 1 0 9 This underscores that while all are Allah’s creations, human safety is prioritized, and unnecessary harm to animals is forbidden, promoting kindness overall (e.g., rights of animals in Islam include not overburdening or abusing them). 0 Thus, the creation of both reflects Allah’s all-encompassing wisdom, mercy, and justice, where harm is relative and purposeful.

Other faiths perspective

Christianity

In Christian theology, the creation of both beneficial animals like cows (providing milk and symbolizing provision) and harmful ones like poisonous snakes is explained through the doctrine of the Fall. Originally, God created all things “very good” (Genesis 1:31), with no death, suffering, or predation—animals were likely vegetarian, and features like venom or fangs may have had non-harmful purposes (e.g., for defense against plants or other benign uses). 1 However, human sin (Adam and Eve’s disobedience) introduced a curse on creation (Genesis 3:14-19), corrupting it and leading to natural evils like venomous animals, thorns, and predation. 2 18 This theodicy posits that such harms result from humanity’s free will choice, allowing for moral growth, redemption through Christ, and an eventual restoration where “the wolf will live with the lamb” and no harm occurs (Isaiah 11:6-9). 11 16 Scholars like Ken Ham argue snakes aren’t inherently evil but became dangerous post-Fall, emphasizing human responsibility over God’s direct intent. 2 Open theists suggest natural evils arise from a dynamic creation with inherent risks, not divine micromanagement. 10

Judaism

Jewish perspectives view all animals as God’s creations (Genesis 1:25), with beneficial ones like cows representing sustenance and sacrifice (e.g., in Temple rituals), while harmful ones like poisonous snakes illustrate the world’s moral complexity and human accountability. The Torah depicts snakes as cursed for tempting Eve (Genesis 3:14), symbolizing deception, but not all snakes are evil—some interpretations see venom as a natural defense or part of ecological balance. 8 Rabbinic texts explain that God created the “evil inclination” (yetzer ha-ra) in humans and potentially in nature for testing faith and enabling free choice; without challenges like dangerous animals, virtue couldn’t exist. 19 Maimonides rationalized natural evils as privations or necessities in a material world, not direct divine malice, serving purposes like population control or reminders of humility. 20 In messianic visions (Isaiah 11:8), children play safely near snakes, implying current harms are temporary, tied to the world’s unredeemed state due to human sin.

Hinduism

Hinduism doesn’t frame creation in strict good-vs-evil binaries but sees all animals as part of the divine play (lila) or manifestations of karma and the gunas (qualities of nature: sattva for goodness, rajas for passion, tamas for inertia). 27 Cows are sacred, embodying nurturing (as in the goddess Kamadhenu, provider of milk and wishes), while snakes (nagas) can be protective (e.g., Vishnu’s serpent Ananta) or destructive, symbolizing cycles of life, death, and rebirth. 22 23 Deities’ vehicles (vahanas) often represent tamed “evils”—e.g., Shiva rides a bull (control over desire), and snakes adorn him, showing mastery over poison (ego or ignorance). 23 Evil in nature arises from maya (illusion) or past karma, not a creator’s whim; Brahman transcends dualities, and harmful creatures maintain dharma (cosmic order) by balancing ecosystems. 25 24 Scholars like Adi Shankara view apparent evils as illusory, necessary for soul evolution toward moksha. 29 Animal sacrifices in some rituals (e.g., to Durga) symbolize triumph over inner demons, not inherent evil in animals. 31

Buddhism

Buddhism rejects a creator God, so the existence of helpful (e.g., cows) and harmful (e.g., snakes) creatures isn’t attributed to divine creation but to interdependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) and karma. 32 33 37 All beings cycle through samsara’s realms (e.g., animal realm for instinct-driven lives), where traits like venom arise from causes like ignorance, greed, or hatred—the three poisons. 32 35 Harmful animals embody suffering (dukkha) from past actions, but they’re not “evil”—just part of impermanent existence; a snake’s poison might result from karmic conditions, teaching compassion. 38 The Buddha emphasized ahimsa (non-harm) toward all creatures, as they could be reborn relatives, promoting ethical treatment to break cycles. 35 41 No theodicy is needed without a God; phenomena like animal traits are empty of inherent essence, arising dependently. 40

Zoroastrianism

Zoroastrian dualism distinctly separates creations: Ahura Mazda (the good creator) made beneficent animals like cows (geush urvan, the soul of the cow, symbolizing purity and sustenance), while the evil spirit Angra Mainyu (Ahriman) countered with harmful “khrafstra” like poisonous snakes, scorpions, and wolves to corrupt the world. 43 46 47 48 Humans must aid good by protecting beneficial animals (e.g., dogs and cattle ward off evil) and destroying evil ones, as part of the cosmic battle leading to frashokereti (renewal), where good triumphs. 42 44 49 50 This logic emphasizes ethical duty: treating animals aligns with asha (truth/righteousness) against druj (lie/evil). 45

WARS: innocent victims vs perpetrators

In wars, infants, children, women and non combatants are killed. The killer and the killed ones too are created by GOD. How these acts are justified, explained in different faiths?

Islam

In Islamic theology, wars are permitted only under strict conditions (e.g., self-defense or oppression removal), but the intentional killing of innocents—such as children, women, and non-combatants—is explicitly forbidden by the Quran and Sunnah, as it violates divine justice and human dignity. 11 12 13 15 The Prophet Muhammad emphasized humanitarian rules: “Do not kill a child, nor a woman, nor an old man, nor obliterate a stream, nor cut a tree” during warfare, drawing from early Caliphs’ directives to avoid harming non-belligerents. 17 Such deaths, when they occur, are attributed to human free will and sin, not God’s direct intent; they serve as tests (fitnah) for believers, fostering patience and reliance on Allah, with ultimate justice in the afterlife where martyrs (including innocents) receive paradise and perpetrators face punishment. 10 14 16 Predestination (qadar) explains that all events, including wars, are within God’s knowledge, but humans bear moral responsibility—innocent suffering highlights the transient world (dunya) and rewards in the hereafter.

Christianity

Christian theodicy frames innocent deaths in wars as tragic consequences of human sin and free will, stemming from the Fall (Genesis 3), which introduced evil into a once-perfect creation. 0 1 8 Just War Theory, developed by Augustine and Aquinas, permits defensive wars but prohibits targeting non-combatants, distinguishing between intended killings (sinful) and foreseen collateral deaths (regrettable but allowable if proportional). 3 4 6 God allows such evils to respect human agency, enabling moral growth, redemption, and the greater good (e.g., heroism or spiritual awakening amid suffering), but does not cause them—Satan and human fallenness are blamed. 2 5 7 Ultimate justification lies in eschatology: innocents receive eternal life, and God will judge killers, turning temporal injustice into divine vindication (e.g., Revelation’s promise of no more tears).

Judaism

Jewish thought views the killing of innocents in wars as a profound moral violation, forbidden by halakha (Jewish law), which mandates protecting non-combatants even in obligatory wars (milchemet mitzvah) like self-defense. 19 20 Theodicy here is complex, often unresolved as a “conundrum” of divine justice—why a merciful God allows such suffering remains mysterious, sometimes attributed to human free will, collective sin, or divine hiddenness (hester panim) during times of rebellion. 21 24 27 Post-Holocaust reflections amplify this: events like the murder of millions challenge faith, with responses including reincarnation (gilgul) to explain innocent suffering as atonement for past lives, or viewing it as part of a larger redemptive plan. 22 23 26 God is not the author of evil but permits it for inscrutable reasons, with justice realized in the world to come (olam ha-ba), where the righteous are rewarded and evil rectified.

Hinduism

Hinduism explains suffering in wars, including innocent deaths, primarily through karma and reincarnation: victims’ afflictions result from past actions (prarabdha karma) across lifetimes, not random divine caprice, allowing souls to evolve toward moksha. 30 36 Dharma yuddha (just war) permits violence only for righteousness, prohibiting harm to non-combatants, the unarmed, or those surrendering, as in the Mahabharata’s rules to minimize suffering. 29 31 33 34 37 The Bhagavad Gita justifies war as duty (svadharma) for warriors like Arjuna, but emphasizes detachment from outcomes—killers accumulate karma if motivated by ego, while innocents’ deaths balance cosmic order. 32 Brahman transcends good and evil; suffering is illusory (maya) in the ultimate non-dual reality, serving as a catalyst for spiritual growth amid cycles of creation and destruction. 35

Buddhism

Without a creator God, Buddhism attributes innocent deaths in wars to interdependent causes like ignorance (avidya), greed, and hatred—the “three poisons”—generating suffering (dukkha) through karma, not divine will. 38 39 40 41 The First Precept prohibits killing any sentient being, making war inherently unskillful as it creates negative karma for killers, perpetuating rebirth in lower realms. 42 43 45 Innocents suffer due to collective or past karma, but this is not punishment—it’s impersonal causation; the Buddha taught nonviolence (ahimsa), urging restraint even in self-defense to break cycles of violence. 44 46 Justification is absent; such acts prolong samsara, with enlightenment offering escape through compassion and mindfulness.

Zoroastrianism

Zoroastrian dualism portrays wars as part of the eternal cosmic battle between Ahura Mazda (good) and Angra Mainyu (evil), where innocent deaths arise from evil’s corruption invading the good creation. 47 49 50 51 Ahura Mazda creates only good, but Ahriman’s finite evil causes suffering, including in conflicts—humans must choose good (asha) over evil (druj) via “good thoughts, words, deeds,” justifying defensive wars against evil forces. 48 52 53 54 Innocents’ suffering is temporary, contained within time until frashokereti (final renovation), when evil is defeated, the dead resurrected, and all purified in perfect unity. 55 56 This framework sees war as ethical when aiding good’s victory, with evil’s actions (not God’s) explaining atrocities.